The Use of Trespass Laws to Enforce Private Policies of Discrimination by Johnston, Hugh S.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 16 | Issue 3 Article 7
1-1965
The Use of Trespass Laws to Enforce Private
Policies of Discrimination
Hugh S. Johnston
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Hugh S. Johnston, The Use of Trespass Laws to Enforce Private Policies of Discrimination, 16 Hastings L.J. 445 (1965).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol16/iss3/7
February, 1965] NOTES
in such cases, it has done so without recognition of the apparent dilemma. If
the courts apply remedial freezing, it seemingly entails an alteration of voter
qualifications in violation of the states' constitutional rights to prescribe voter
qualifications. If the courts do not invoke remedial freezing in cases which war-
rant it, the effects of past discrimination will be sealed into permanent existence.
If freezing is to be used by the courts the Supreme Court should solve this
dilemma.
The most obvious answer lies in the recognition that though the states have
the right to prescribe voter qualifications,1 they do not have the power to deny
the right of an individual to vote on account of race, color or previous condition
of servitude.32 The adoption of the fifteenth amendment was intended to limit
the states' rights to prescribe voter qualifications. To permanently freeze the
unconstitutionally gained preferred status of the white voter under the guise of
states' rights is as much a denial of the right to vote in violation of the fifteenth
amendment as the the voting requirements which the courts have consistently
struck down.
Conclusion
Remedial freezing appears to be a useful equitable remedy to be applied by
the federal courts in voter registration cases. Although its use may be a big step
towards achieving equal rights for a deprived class, the courts must consider
the warning offered that it should only be applied where there is great need.33
Otherwise many states which at one time were guilty of discrimination in voter
qualifications shall never be able to tighten voter qualifications in an honest effort
to raise the quality of their electorate.
In light of this warning the fairest solution in situations where there has
been discrimination would be to have a complete registration of all voters and
potential voters under the same standards. But since the federal courts do not
have the power to order a re-registration, remedial freezing must be invoked
where. states refuse to re-register their electorate.
Michael Dowling*
31 Cases cited notes 21, 27 supra.
32 U.S. CONS?. amend. XV; see Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
83 United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733, 744 (5th Cir. 1963).
Member, Second Year Class.
THE USE OF TRESPASS LAWS TO ENFORCE
PRIVATE POLICIES OF DISCRIMINATION
The Problem
In 1964 the Supreme Court decided a group of sit-in cases which involved
the arrests and convictions of civil rights demonstrators under state criminal
trespass statutes.' The demonstrations were on the premises of privately owned
'Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
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amusement parkS2 and at lunch counters in department stores,3 drug stores,4
and restaurants.5 In all of these cases the management had a policy of racial
segregation which it attempted to enforce by utilization of local police, prose-
cutors, and courts. In all of these cases the defendants asserted that the state
violated the first section of the fourteenth amendment prohibition against state
action which denies to any person the equal protection of the laws. The basic
constitutional issue raised in these cases was, then, whether it is violative of the
equal protection clause for the state, through local police, prosecutors, and courts,
to respond to a call by a private citizen who seeks to employ criminal trespass
laws to enforce his private policy of segregation. In none of the cases was a
majority of the Supreme Court able to resolve this issue, although six Justices
expressed the opinion that the exigencies of contemporary racial conflict demanded
a judicial determination. 6
The reason for -the Court's failure to resolve this issue seems to lie more in
the application of the state action concept to the fact situations presented, than
in the Court's policy of refusing to decide a federal question when state grounds
might be found upon which to decide the case.7 The purpose of this note is to
discuss the problems raised in applying fourteenth amendment principles to
situations where trespass laws are used to enforce private policies of racial
segregation.
The Fourteenth Amendment: In General
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment is as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its urisdiction the equal protection of the laws.8
The first Supreme Court construction of the Civil War Amendments
(thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen) was in the Slaughter-House Cases9 in 1873.
It was said there that the primary purpose of the amendments was to establish
freedom for a race recently emancipated from slavery and to protect these
226 (1964); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 146 (1964) (breach of the peace and trespass); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
130 (1964).
2 Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
3 Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
4 Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 146 (1964).
5 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
6Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 286 (Warren, C.J., Douglas, and Goldberg, JJ.,
concurring), 318 (Black, Harlan, and White, JJ., dissenting) (1964).
"Id. at 243. Douglas, J., indicated that the Court "resurrected" a state law issue
which was not raised during the argument in order to avoid facing the constitutional
question.
8 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. (Emphasis added.)
983 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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freedmen from the oppressions of their former masters. 10 The first sentence of
the fourteenth amendment overturned the Dred Scott" decision and established
national and state citizenship for the freedman.' 2 It was also determined that only
those privileges and immunities incident to national citizenship were guaranteed
by the amendment.' 3 Such privileges and immunities were those already pro-
tected by article four, section two of the Constitution: "The citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several States."' 4 The Court found that a "general idea" of the civil rights
guaranteed could be determined by examining the privileges and immunities
clause of the Articles of Confederation.' 5 Those rights included the right of all
free inhabitants of each state to free ingress and regress to and from any other
state and the right to enjoy in any state all the privileges of trade and commerce,
subject to the same duties and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof.'0 Other
express limitations upon the states were also included, such as the prohibitions
against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and laws impairing the obligation of
contracts. 17 The right to public accommodations, incidentally, was not specifically
included as an incident of national citizenship.
In Strauder v. West Virginia,'8 decided in 1880, the Court held that a state
statute which discriminated on the basis of race in the selection of jurors violated
the equal protection clause. The right to a trial by a jury of one's peers, while
an incident of state citizenship and therefore not a privilege or immunity incident
to national citizenship, is nevertheless protected against action by the state
which denies the equal protection of that right.'9 It was established that the
fourteenth amendment should be given a liberal interpretation, securing for the
freedman "all the civil rights that the superior race enjoys," and rendering the
law in the states identical for black and white.20 The Court also stated that
Congress made no attempt to enumerate the rights the amendment was designed
to protect, in order to make its terms as comprehensive as possible.2 1
In Virginia v. Rives,' s a companion case to Strauder, the variation in form
10 Id. at 67-76.
11 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
12 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 67.
13 Id. at 68-70. In regard to the privileges and immunities clause the Court stated
that the clause protected the same privileges and immunities as found in the fourth
article of the Articles of Confederation. Free ingress and regress to and from any other
state and privileges of trade and commerce were specified in the articles, although
they were not intended to be exclusive.
14 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
1583 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 75. See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
310 (1880), where the Court concluded that state statutes which discriminated on the
grounds of race in the selection of jurors denied a civil right in violation of the equal
protection clause.
1683 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 75.
17 Id. at 77.
18 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
'OId. at 308-09.
20 Id. at 306-07.
21 Id. at 310.
22 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
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which the prohibited state action could take was expressed: "It is, doubtless, true
that a state may act through different agencies, either by its legislative, its
executive, or its judicial authorities; and the prohibitions of the amendment
extend to all action of the State denying equal protection of the laws . . ."3
Yet in the Civil Rights Cases24 of 1883 it was made clear that the fourteenth
amendment does not prohibit private conduct, however wrongful or discrimina-
tory it may be, and that the individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject matter of the amendment. In applying these early cases to situations
where an individual is arrested for trespassing at a lunch counter or amusement
park, it is clear that the right to enjoy the use of such establishments is not
protected under the privileges and immunities clause unless it is a right incidental
to national citizenship.25 However, if it is an incident of state citizenship, only
action by the state falls within the prohibitions of .the due process or equal
protection clauses.26 Thus a distinction between individual and state action
concerned the Court at an early date.
Turning for the moment from cases initially construing the fourteenth
amendment, some light can be shed on exactly what rights, or class of rights,
the framers of the amendment intended the equal protection clause to secure by
examining speeches delivered in Congress at the time of its inception. In the
opinion of the author of the first section of the amendment, Congressman John
A. Bingham, its purpose was to protect by national law the "inborn rights of
every person within its [the Republic's] jurisdiction whenever the same shall
be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State."2 He was:
furthermore,' of the opinion that the amendment empowered Congress to define,
by law, what rights and privileges should be secured to all citizens. 28 In introduc-
ing what later became the first section of the amendment to the House, Mr.
Bingham proposed that the Bill of Rights, as found in the first eight amendments,
be incorporated in the fourteenth amendment.2 9 An objection to the proposal was
immediately raised on the grounds that power would be centralized in the
federal government in derogation of the states, since Congress would be em-
powered to protect rights which theretofore lay within the exclusive realm of
state legislation.86 Apparently, both the proponents and opponents of the
proposed amendment agreed it would increase federal power, the major dissen-
sion being over whether or not such an expansion of centralized authority was
desirable.
31
In introducing the proposed amendment to the Senate, J. M. Howard,
Republican, Michigan, stated that the equal protection clause was designed to
abolish all class legislation and to subject all persons to the same laws and
23 Id. at 318.
24109 U.S. 3 (1883).
25Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67 (1873).
26 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
2 7 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542-43 (1886); see FLACK, THE ADOPT-
TiON OF TE FOuRTEENTm AmENDmmN 79 (1908) [hereinafter cited as FLACx].
28 FL~cr 81.
29 Id. at 56-57. Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1947) (four
Justices dissenting), with Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
30 FLACK 57-58.
31 Id. at 81.
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punishments. 8 2 No attempt was made in either house to enumerate precisely
what rights were deserving of equal protection, although all the privileges,
immunities and rights guaranteed by the second section of article four and by the
first eight amendments were to be within the ambit of the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.83 Indeed, the object of the
equal protection afforded was to inhibit all manner of discrimination which
might be devised under the so-called 'Black Codes."3 4 After the amendment
was adopted, a Congressman who had been present when the amendment was
before the House suggested that all the rights found in both the Constitution
and the common law were guaranteed. Thus the state could not prevent anyone
from attending public schools, from visiting an inn, or from enjoying the benefits
of a common carrier without violating a right secured by section one.3 5
Although the preceding argument was reflected in the vehement dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases,3 6 the other eight Justices
agreed that if an individual is refused accommodations at an inn, public con-
veyance, or place of public amusement by the owner thereof, his remedy must
be sought under the laws of the state.37 The Court held that the fourteenth
amendment did not give Congress the power to enact those portions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 which attempted to grant the right against racial dis-
crimination in places of public accommodations and to impose penalties upon
individuals who so discriminated.
33
Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition against state laws
and state proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by power
given to congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into
effect; and such legislation must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed
state laws or state proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their
operation and effect.3 9
82 Id. at 87.
83 Id. at 84-87.
84 Id. at 96. It has been suggested ihat one of the purposes of the fourteenth
amendment was to give validity to the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, which Mr. Bingham
believed to be unconstitutional. It was feared that the bill would be repealed even
if held constitutional when the Democrats came to power. The Civil Rights Bill was
directed against the "Black Codes" of the South and the fourteenth amendment would
have to be broad enough to prohibit whatever discriminatory legislation might be de-
vised under the Codes. FLACx 94-95.
35Id. at 256. In Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 240 (1964) (concurring opinion),
Goldberg, J., commented that the congressional debates demonstrated that access to
public accommodations was a right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The
Justice's citations, however, referred to debates over proposed legislation, but not to
the amendment itself. 378 U.S. at 335. The textual material above referred to the
amendment directly, but during a debate over proposed legislation.
86 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
87Id. at 24.
88 Id. at 26.
39 Id. at 11-12. But the right to certain areas of public accommodations can be
derived from the right to travel, a federal privilege under U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, as
established by Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868). See also Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 250-51 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Accordingly, discrimination at places of public accommodation is prohibited by
the fourteenth amendment only to the extent state laws and proceedings dis-
criminate. Whether or not this result accurately reflects the intent of Congress,
however, is a question still debated.
40
Problems in Applying the Fourteenth Amendment
As an aid in applying the equal protection clause to a given fact situation
it is useful to determine (1) whether the offending action was that of the state
and (2) if so, whether that action denied the petitioners the equal protection
which the amendment was intended to secure. 41 The preceding text dealt
generally with both questions. The first question presents the concept of state
action, which has led to several theories that tend to broaden the application of
the amendment. The second raises the problem of finding a case of discrimina-
tion against the petitioners. The emphasis herein is placed primarily upon the
state action concept because the fact of discrimination on the basis of race
was admitted in the 1964 sit-in cases.
In general, there -is no "ironclad test" to determine when state involvement
is state action within the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment.42 There
is also no need for the state action to have a discriminatory purpose. If the
state leases land to a tenant who excludes Negroes from his cafeteria, the lessee
stands in the place of the state and his purpose is that of the state.43 Yet the
prohibited action must be such as may fairly be said to be that of the state.44
The Court has indicated that even state inaction may constitute state action,
as demonstrated in another lease case, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
45
where the State leased part of its building to a privately managed cafeteria and
did nothing to prevent segregation on the premises. The Court there relied in
part on Cooper v. Aaron,46 in which state action was extended to state participa-
tion in the challenged activity "through any arrangement, management, funds,
or property .... ,47 Some theories which have evolved from the state action
concept will next be examined, in order to determine how the Court has
applied the theory within various contexts.
Under Color of State Law Theory
In dealing with the acts of state officials, the under color of state law
theory was developed to bring the acts of these officials within federal statutes
40 Compare concurring opinion of Goldberg, J., in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226, 286 (1964) (that the fourteenth amendment removed disabilities from Negroes
in places of public accommodations), with the dissenting opinion of Black, J., 378 U.S.
at 335, 340.
41 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1948).
42 Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Conm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
4SDerrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
924 (1957).
44 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
45 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
46358 U.S. 1 (1958).
47 Id. at 19.
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which prohibit the deprivation of rights secured by the fourteenth amendment. 48
In Ex parte Virginia,49 a State judge was indicted under the Civil Rights Act
of 187550 for excluding from juries citizens of African descent who possessed
all other qualifications prescribed by law. The fourteenth amendment was
interpreted to mean that "whoever, by virtue of public position under a State
government.. . denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates
the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name of the State, and is clothed
with the State's power, his act is that of the State."58 The particular act of the
state officer need not be authorized by the state, for as long as he is clothed
with state power, even the misuse of such power is action taken under color
of state law. 2 A warrant of arrest in the hands of a sheriff or his deputy is
color of authority and acts done in the execution thereof are under color of law.5
Even when a private detective acts under the orders and pay of a private
employer and uses force to obtain a confession, a jury is entitled to find that
the detective acted under color of law if he had a special city police officer's
card. 4 Similarly, where plant guards under the plant owner's pay and control
are also sworn in as civilian auxiliaries to military police, their performance of
police functions is under color of state law, even though they simultaneously act
as company employees. 5 Thus it appears an officer's conduct may be under
color of state law within the inhibitions of the fourteenth amendment even
though contrary to, or in excess of, the authority granted him under state law.56
Instrumentality Theory
It has already been observed that state action may be taken through
various agencies.57 Yet problems arise in determining to what extent such action
falls within the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment. In applying the
equal protection clause to situations where a private property owner attempts
to use criminal trespass laws, the landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer58 is a use-
ful starting point. In Shelley the State court was called upon by private parties
4 8
REv. STAT. § 5510 (1875), 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1948).
49 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
50 Section 4, 18 Stat. 336 (1875), 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1948).
51 100 U.S. at 377; accord, Home Telephone & Telg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S.
278, 287 (1913).
52 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Even where a deputy sheriff
removed his badge and stated his acts thereafter were not to be in the name of the law,
he was acting under color of law. Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902, 906 (4th
Cir. 1943).
53 Screws v. United States, 140 F.2d 662, 665 (5th Cir. 1944), affd, 325 U.S. 91
(1945).
54 Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
55 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416 (1947).
56 Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1958).
57 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
58334 U.S. 1 (1948). See generally T. P. LEwis, THE MEANiNG oF STATE ACTION,
60 COLum. L. REv. 1083 (1960); SCHWELB, THE Srr-IN DxsmONsTEATIoN: CnumanAL
ThESpASS OR CONs TrrnoNAL RrrHT?, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 779 (1961); SUTrERFaL,
LAw AND LAwxxas IN A CHANGING WoRLD, 48 A.B.A.J. 922, 928-30 (1962); 44 CArn.X.
L. Rxv. 718 (1956).
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to enforce racially restrictive covenants on land.59 Both the vendor and vendee
were willing to conclude the sale, but the owners of other property subject to
the same covenants brought suit to specifically enforce them.60 The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, concluded that while "the
restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any
rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment,"61 the courts'
enforcement of the restrictions "denied petitioners the equal protection of the
laws."62 Shelley then stands for the proposition that while purely individual
discrimination does not constitute state action, state court enforcement of that
discrimination is violative of the equal protection clause. In a subsequent
restrictive covenant case, 63 the Shelley doctrine was extended somewhat by a
holding that an award by a state court of damages against the covenantor for
breach of the covenant would also constitute state action and deprive non-
Caucasians of equal protection of the laws. 64 Although the Court has shown some
hesitance to further extend the Shelley doctrine,65 the language used in the
case was broad enough to include situations where "the particular pattern of
discrimination, which the state has enforced, was defined initially by the terms
of a private agreement." 66
As exemplified by Shelley, state action within the prohibitions of the
fourteenth amendment refers to exertions of state power in all forms, and by any
instrumentality, or agency, of the state without regard to the fact the discrimina-
tion has its inception in a private agreement. This interpretation of the constitu-
tional provision has been criticized on the grounds that private discrimination is
not forbidden by the fourteenth amendment, 67 and that the mere invoking
of judicial assistance transforms individual action into prohibited state action. 63
Yet it appears well established that one of the purposes of the fourteenth
amendment was to secure the right of all to own, purchase, and dispose of
property.69 Furthermore, in Shelley this right was guaranteed by federal
legislation.70 And since both the vendor and vendee were willing to conclude
59 334 U.S. at 4.
60Id. at 19.
61 Id. at 13.
62 Id. at 20.
63 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
64 Id. at 254.
65 Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) (decided on narrow grounds).
The dissenting opinion of Douglas, J., joined by Warren, C. J., and Black, J., indicated
Shelley should apply because the government through its judicial branch gave legal
effect to a contract. 351 U.S. at 302-03. See also Dorsey v. Stuyvesant 299 N.Y. 512,
87 N.E.2d 541 (1949).
66 334 U.S. at 20.
67 L-wis, supra note 58, at 1113.
68 SuTrERFmLD, supra note 58, at 928-30.
69 See FLAcK 85, 87.
70334 U.S. 1, 11 (1948). REv. STAT. § 1977 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1870),
gives to all persons the same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white
citizens. REv. STAT. § 1978 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1866), gives to all citizens of
the United States the same right to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property as is enjoyed by white citizens.
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the sale, the exercise of that right would have been uninhibited but for the action
of the State courts.
Another case illustrating the instrumentality theory is Pennsylvania v. Board
of Trusts,7 1 in which -the policy of discrimination was initiated by the will of
Step'hen Girard, probated in 1831, which left a fund in trust for the establishment
of a college.72 By the terms of the will, the college was to admit "as many poor
white, male orphans, between the ages of six and ten years, as the said income
shall be adequate to maintain." The will named the City of Philadelphia as
trustee and the Philadelphia Board of Directors of City Trusts was appointed to
that position. The board refused to admit the petitioners, who met all the
entrance qualifications except that they were Negroes.73 The orphan's court
rejected the petitioners' contention that the board had violated the fourteenth
amendment. 74 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and remanded
the Pennsylvania judgment on the grounds that since the board which operated
Girard College was an agency of the State, its refusal to admit the Negroes was
discrimination by the State, even though the board acted as a trustee.75
The Supreme Court has asserted that state action prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment includes all state action which infringes upon those rights which
the amendment sought -to secure, no matter what agency of the state takes the
action or under what guise it is taken.7 6 It is enough that the Court recognizes
the state as a "joint participant in the challenged activity" for the instrumentality
doctrine to apply. 7
Other Theories
It has been urged that for the state to enforce a custom of segregation constitutes
state action. Garner v. Louisiana,78 the first sit-in case to reach the Supreme Court,
reversed State convictions for disturbing the peace during a sit-in at segregated
lunch counters. Although the reversal was based upon insufficient evidence,79 the
petitioners had advanced the theory that the participation of police and the courts
to enforce a state custom of segregation resulted in state action.80 Subsequent
sit-in cases, however, have tended to examine -the extent of the state's participa-
tion in the discriminatory activity, rather than merely the existence of a custom,
in order to establish state action.
Still another theory of state action was advanced in Mr. Justice Douglas'
concurring opinion in Garner,8 ' in which he urged broader grounds for reversal
based on what may be described as a licensing theory. His thesis was that
71353 U.S. 230 (1957) (per curiam) (also called the Girard College case).
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74In re Girard's Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 671 (Orphans Ct. Philadelphia), aff'd,
386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956), rev'd sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts,
353 U.S. 230 (1957).
71 Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957).
78 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958).
77 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
78368 U.S. 157 (1961).
79 Id. at 163.
80 Ibid.
81 Id. at 176.
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since an eating establishment must be licensed by the state to conduct business,
the state may not constitutionally license a restaurant which segregates its
premises.8 2 He drew an analogy between licenses issued by the state to
establishments serving the public and leases of public facilities to similar
establishments, such as occurred in the Burton case.88 The root of this theory
goes back to the dissenting opinion of the first Mr. Justice Harlan in the Civil
Rights Cases.8 4 He argued that places of public accommodation are themselves
agencies or instrumentalities of the states since their duties and functions are
amenable to state regulation.8 5 Of course he was proposing an instrumentality
doctrine, but it brought restaurants within the category of a state agency
through the state's exercise of regulatory (licensing) power. The licensing theory
has been criticized on the grounds that it is too inclusive, since practically all
business establishments are subject to state regulation. 8
The 1964 Sit-in Cases
Griffin v. Maryland87
In Griffin a Negro civil rights demonstrator obtained from a Caucasian a
ticket which entitled the bearer to one ride on the carousel at the privately
owned and managed Glen Echo Amusement Park in Montgomery County,
Maryland. Although the park sought the patronage of the general public through
advertisements, the demonstrators were aware of the management's policy of
discrimination. The Negro, Griffin, entered the park (no general admission
ticket was required) and sat down on the carousel. The park employed Collins
to enforce its policy of racial discrimination. Collins was also retained and paid
by the National Detective Agency and wore its uniform, although he was subject
to the control and direction of the park's management. At the request of the
park he was deputized as a sheriff of Montgomery County pursuant to a county
ordinance 8 and wore a deputy sheriff's badge during the following incident.
After consulting with the management Collins approached Griffin, informed
him of the park's policy and told him he would be arrested for trespassing if he
failed to leave the premises. After a reasonable time had elapsed, Collins informed
Griffin that he was under arrest and took him to the Montgomery County police
station where he filed an application for a warrant by a police officer, charging
82 Id. at 184.
83 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
84 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
85 Id. at 37-42.
86 Still other theories which have been suggested are: "balancing the interests" in
which the courts balance competing constitutional rights to determine if equal protection
was denied by the state, and "significant state involvement" in which the fourteenth
amendment is only applied when state agencies or officials directed or forbade the
specific conduct in question. Lnvis, supra note 58, at 121-140.
87378 U.S. 130 (1964). Compare Drews v. State, 224 Md. 186, 167 A.2d 341
(1961), vacated and remanded sub nom. Drews v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 547 (1964) (per
curiam), aff'd, 33 U.S.L. Wan 2200 (Md. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1964).
88 Id. at 132 n.1. Section 2-91 of the MoNrrommy Co. CODE of 1955 provides
that special deputy sheriffs may be appointed for duty in connection with the property
of individuals or corporations.
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Griffin with criminal trespass under the Maryland statute. 89 The warrant itself
recited -that the complaint had been made by "Collins Deputy Sheriff" and that
Griffin had been asked to leave by the Deputy Sheriff of Glen Echo Park. An
amended warrant was later filed which charged Griffin with unlawfully entering
after having been told not to do so by "an agent" of the corporation which operated
the park. The Maryland Court of Appeals in affirming the subsequent conviction,9 0
stated that "the arrest and conviction of these appellants for a criminal trespass
as a result of the enforcement by the operator of the park of its lawful policy of
segregation, did not constitute such action as may fairly be said to be that of the
State."9 1
In an opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the Supreme Court
reversed,92 and held that the action of Collins who was a sheriff and also a park
employee hired to enforce a racial segregation policy, denied Griffin equal
protection of the laws secured by the fourteenth amendment.93
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Griffin,94 conceded that Collins acted as
deputy sheriff even though he had a right as a private citizen to arrest Griffin
for a misdemeanor committed in his presence; but, he said, the State involvement
was "no different from what it would have been had the arrest been made by
a regular policeman dispatched from police headquarters."95 The State involve-
ment was different. There was a greater degree of State participation in the
denial of equal protection than in the case posed by Mr. Justice Harlan because
the State had clothed with its authority one whose very purpose of employment
was to enforce a policy of discrimination. According to the under color of law
theory, it was immaterial that Collins could have acted in his private capacity
or that the State did not specifically authorize him to take the action he took.98
Collins' status was that of a deputy sheriff under contract to enforce a private
policy of discrimination.
The Griffin decision relied in part on the Girard College case in which a
state agency was authorized to act as trustee for a private institution.97 Just
as the trustee, an agency of the state, enforced a private policy of discrimination,
so did Collins. As the Shelley case demonstrated, it was immaterial that the
discrimination had its inception in a private agreement.9 8 Yet Shelley is distin-
guishable from Griffin by the fact that in the former both the owner of the
land subject to a restrictive covenant and the vendee were willing to carry out
the proposed sale. Only through state interference upon the instigation of
others subject to the terms of the covenant were the willing parties inhibited. In
Griffin the owner of the land was quite unwilling to allow Negroes to remain
89 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 577 (Supp. 1961), makes it a misdemeanor to "enter
upon or cross over the land ... of any person . . . after having been duly notified by
the owner or his agent not to do so."
9o Griffn v. State, 225 Md. 422, 171 A.2d 717 (1961).
91 Id. at 431, 171 A.2d at 721.
92 Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
93 Id. at 135.
94 Id. at 138.
95Ibid.
961d. at 135; see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
97353 U.S. 230 (1957). See text accompanying note 71 supra.
98334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948).
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upon the premises. In Shelley, furthermore, the parties who were seeking to
enforce the policy of discrimination were in no way clothed with state authority,
as was the board of trustees in the Girard College case or Collins in Griffin. In the
latter two cases there is present the element of a private party whose policy of
racial discrimination is enforced through his agent who, in turn, is also an agent
of the state. Omit these elements of dual agency and state inhibition of a property
transaction, and the fundamental constitutional issue is raised. Is it violative of
the equal protection clause for the state, through local police, prosecutors, and
courts, to respond to a call by a private citizen who seeks to enforce his private
policy of segregation through criminal trespass laws? The issue was squarely
placed before the Supreme Court in the following case.
Bell v. Maryland99
In Bell v. Maryland, a companion case to Griffin, 00 the petitioners, all Negro
sit-in demonstrators, entered a segregated restaurant and were asked to leave by
an employee of the owner, a corporation. The employee was acting under orders
from the president of the corporation, and the request to leave was admittedly
made on the basis of color alone. When the petitioners refused to leave, the
owner went to the police station and swore out warrants for their arrest. They
were subsequently arrested by the police and convicted under the same criminal
trespass statute upon which the convictions were based in Griffin.'10 After the
convictions were affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals, however, Mary-
land and Baltimore enacted public accomodations laws which abolished the
crime of which the petitioners were convicted.10 2 The Court avoided reaching the
broad constitutional issue, reversed the convictions, and remanded the case to the
Maryland Court of Appeals with instructions to determine whether the State's
general saving clause statute would save the convictions.' 0 3 Six Justices, however,
splitting three to three, did reach the broad issue.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg,' 0 4 joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, and Mr. Justice Douglas, concluded that a state may not
frustrate the constitutionally secured right to be admitted to places of public
accommodations on a racially equal basis through the use of its criminal trespass
99378 U.S. 226 (1964). #
100 There were three other sit-in cases decided on the same day as Bell and Griffin.
Boule v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153
(1964), and Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964). All three, however, were
decided on narrow grounds without reaching the constitutional issue which is the subject
of this note. Although Bell was also decided on narrow grounds, six Justices did discuss
the constitutional issue, splitting three to three.
101 MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 577 (Supp. 1961).
102 MD. ANN. CoDE art. 49B, § 11 (Supp. 1963); BALnMmomE, MD., Crry CoD, art
14A, § 10A (1950 ed.).
Los MD. ANN. CODE: art. 1, § 3 (1957). The common-law rule, as followed in Mary-
land, requires the dismissal of pending criminal proceedings where the defendant's con-
duct is no longer deemed criminal due to a supervening change in state law. 378 U.S.
at 230-32. The saving clause statute, however, saves state convictions from the effect of
the common-law rule in certain circumstances. 378 U.S. at 232-37.
104378 U.S. 226, 286 (1964).
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laws.10 5 A distinction was drawn between "civil rights,' which the fourteenth
amendment was intended to protect, and "social rights,"- such as rights
pertaining to privacy and private association, which are also entitled to constitu-
tional protection. The "history and the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment
compel the conclusion that the right to be served in places of public accommoda-
tion regardless of color cannot constitutionally be subordinated to the pro-
prietor's interest in discriminatorily refusing service."106 To support this conclusion
Mr. Justice Goldberg argued that even the Civil Rights Cases assumed that a
state cannot abridge the right to enjoy equal accommodations in public convey-
ances, inns, and places of public amusement, even though Congress cannot legislate
to prohibit individual action. 107 Since equal protection may be denied by the failure
of the state to take preventative measures, as in the Burton case, state failure to
protect the petitioners' right to public accommodations is prohibited state action.' 0 8
The Justice then appealed to the "logic" of Brown v. Board of Educ.,10 9
which concluded that in public education the doctrine of "separate but equal"
had no place." 0 This appeal may be criticized on the grounds that Brown neither
referred to public accommodations nor to property owners who attempt to use
trespass laws to enforce segregation. The "ogic" of the decision, while condemning
racial segregation, was directed at state action through discriminatory legislation
and not through the conduct of police or the courts."
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion joined by Mr. Justice Gold-
berg,112 relied on Shelley v. Kraemer for the proposition that if a court decree is
state action in Shelley, the same result should be reached here." 3 He concluded
that "when the state police, the state prosecutor, and the state courts unite to
convict Negroes for renouncing that relic of slavery [segregation in restaurants],
the 'State' violates the Fourteenth Amendment."" 4 He urged also that since
restaurants are as essential as common carriers to interstate travelers, the right
to be served in restaurants is an incident of national citizenship; therefore, it is
within the privileges and immunities clauses of article IV, section 2, and the
fourteenth amendment." 5 He avoided drawing distinctions between "civil"
and "social" rights by demonstrating that the owners of the restaurants involved
in the sit-in cases are usually large corporations and, consequently, the corporate
managers and stockholders have no personal right to private association because
"fastening apartheid on America [is not] a worthy occasion for tearing aside
the corporate veil."" 0 This argument is open to criticism on the grounds that it
105 Id. at 311.
108 Id. at 315.
lo Id. at 306. A more accurate statement would be that the Civil Rights Cases
"assumed, without deciding, for the sake of argument." 109 U.S. at 19.
108 378 U.S. at 310-11.
109347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110 Id. at 495.
11Id. at 486 n.l.
112 378 U.S. 226, 242.
I's Id. at 259.
114 Id. at 260.
115 Id. at 250-52, 255.
1161d. at 271 (Appendix I to the opinion of Douglas, J.).
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relies heavily on Shelley v. Kraemer to find state action,'1 7 as the dissenting opinion
in Bell pointed out." 8
Three dissenting Justices also reached the basic constitutional question in an
opinion written by Mr. Justice Black, joined by Justices Harlan and White. 19
They asserted that the fourteenth amendment "does not forbid a State to prosecute
for crimes committed against a person or his property, however prejudiced or
narrow the victim's views may be." °20 The dissenters insisted that the petitioners'
reliance on Shelley v. Kraemer to establish prohibited state action was mis-
placed.' 2 ' When a property owner chooses not to sell to an individual, or
not to admit him, the owner is entitled to due process of law to protect his
enjoyment of property. This argument adopts the view expressed in the Civil
Rights Cases'122 that there must be valid federal legislation based upon some
constitutional grant of power before the fourteenth amendment limits a private
owner's free use of his property.
23
In Shelley legislation had been enacted, thereby protecting the willing
vendor and vendee.124 Consequently, for the Court to enforce the restrictive
covenant denied the equal protection of a right guaranteed by valid federal
legislation. 125 In Bell, however, the restaurant owner's right to enjoy his property
had not been diminished by such legislation. 126 Furthermore, when one party
refuses to transact, the situation is no longer analogous to Shelley.'2 7 The Bell
dissenters were of the opinion that the historical proof offered by Justices Douglas
and Goldberg did not establish that the right to public accommodations is an
incident of national citizenship, 28 and that much of it was out of context?12 9
Conclusion
The questions raised in the 1964 sit-in cases have not all been rendered moot
by the enactment of the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.130 The reason is that the act's definition of establishments serving the public
which are classified as places of public accommodation is not all-inclusive.'
31
Omitted, for example, are establishments which provide lodging to transient guests
17 Note, 53 GEo. L.J. 226, 234 (1964).
118 378 U.S. at 328.
"9 Id. at 318.
12o Id. at 327.
ll Id. at 328.
122109 U.S. 3 (1883).
123 Ibid.
'
2 4 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
125 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
126 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917), which established that once
one becomes a property owner he acquires all the rights that go with ownership unless
a valid statute diminishes those rights.
127 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 331 (dissenting opinion).
128 Id. at 340.
129 Id. at 335-40.
13042 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a-2000a-6, 2000(a), 2000(b)(1), 2000(c)(1) (1964).
Held constitutional under the commerce clause in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). See also Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1984);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
13142 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1964).
[Vol. 16THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
